![]() ![]() This claim, though, is not at all obvious but rather seems to require an argument. Finally, after his extensive argument for the distinction between the loveliest and likeliest explanation, Lipton ultimately concludes that if IBE is a reasonable model for our inferential practices, loveliness and likeliness will tend to be coextensive (p. ![]() As he avoids this analysis in terms of probability, IBE, as Inference to the Loveliest Explanation, can stand as an independent account on its own right. Instead, he takes the loveliest explanation to be the one that, if correct, provides the most understanding (p. In this way, Lipton attempts to avoid trivialising his model by assimilating it to those accounts that seek the most probable explanation. In particular, he characterizes IBE as inference to the loveliest explanation, not inference to the likeliest explanation. In chapter 4, Lipton embarks on a more systematic treatment of IBE. Yet given the small number of pages, and the volume of material that Lipton addresses, it is quite demanding. Lipton's presentation of these introductory themes is rich, well informed and competent. In other words, they do not employ causal talk to explain an event simpliciter, but rather an event together with the absence of another event, similar in kind. These explanations are unique in that they do not attempt to answer the question 'Why this?' but the question 'Why this rather than that ? ' (p. This favoured version is that of contrastive explanation. Despite his scepticism about existing philosophical frameworks for explanation, he does argue throughout chapter 3 that a version of the causal model of explanation best supplements the general inferential pattern of IBE. On the explanation front, he argues that the absence of a satisfactory theory of explanation need not preclude us from analyzing IBE philosophically. On the inference side, Lipton reviews various accounts of inductive inference and notes their shortcomings, which IBE hopes to overcome. As its name indicates, IBE is concerned with the notions of inference and explanation, which are introduced in the first three chapters of the book. While Lipton touches on justificatory issues, his primary focus is the descriptive merits of Bayesianism and IBE, a subject that the author argues has been rather neglected. ![]() As such, exploring its merits on both counts is of great importance for contemporary philosophy of science. In other words, it is supposed to be both an accurate description of the inferential processes of actual science and also endowed with the property of conferring epistemic warrant to the conclusions reached by means of it. IBE recently has been championed as a distinctive kind of inductive inference, broadly understood, which has the dual attributes of doing justice to the actual workings of science and the demands for its rational justification. In particular, he attempts a reconciliation between the Bayesian approach and that offered by Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). Not only does Lipton elaborate and expand on the themes covered in the first edition, but he also adds a new chapter on Bayesianism. ![]() Yet in the second edition of the book, Lipton proves that even a classic can be improved. The first edition of Peter Lipton's Inference to the Best Explanation, which appeared in 1991, is a modern classic in the philosophy of science. ![]()
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